Stickiness" has been studied for scholars in recent years. This study is based on sample data of 210 natural person holding companies. It uses SPSS20.0 statistical software for data statistics and analysis to explore the impact of interaction between executive compensation stickiness and the large stockholder control on the performance. The research finds that executive compensation stickiness is widespread, and there is no correlation with large shareholder control. But the interaction between them has positive effect on corporate performance. It shows that executive compensation stickiness and large shareholder control exist rationally. For the long-term development of the enterprises, it is necessary to effectively control the stickiness of executive compensation and establish a scientific salary mechanism.
INTRODUCTION
Executive compensation stickiness is an asymmetry phenomenon between executive compensation and performance of listed companies. When performance increases, the range of increasing in compensation is significantly higher than the range of decreasing during the bad performance, that is, salary stickiness exists. The large stockholder control in this study mainly refers to the equity control of large stockholders, including the controlling proportion of the largest stockholder and the equity restriction ration. A natural person holding company is a joint stock company directly controlled by a natural person. A natural person holding company distinguishes itself with high ownership concentration, poor equity restriction, and high shareholding proportion of executives. Is it common for executive compensation stickiness in such companies? Is it related to the control of the large stockholder? Does the interaction of those two affect company performance? Is the existence of executive compensation stickiness reasonable? This paper attempts to answer these questions above in order to provide some practical references for our country's corporate governance.
II. PROPOSING RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The compensation is a reward for effort made by an enterprise to its executives. If the company performance declines, they will reduce salary, and it's difficult to retain talents, and would also weaken the enthusiasm of executive. So it is not conducive to the enterprises' long-term development, that is, objective compensation stickiness exists. The empirical results by Zhu Linxiang and others (2015) [1] , Chen Shengjun and others (2015) [2] , Li Fei (2015) [3] have shown that executive compensation stickiness exists in listed companies basically. Tang Xiaoli (2010) [4] , Wang Xiaowei,Chen Fengbo (2014) [5] , Zhang Weiting (2015) [6] and other scholars have proved that large stockholder control affects corporate performance, but the direction and extent of the impact did not come to agreement. Wang Qi and Wu Chong(2013) [7] made a study of associating the control of large stockholder with executive compensation. They found that the higher proportion of large stockholders holding, the greater influence of executive compensation effect on corporate performance; the large stockholder control has synergistic effect and entrenchment effect influencing executive compensation incentive, but it did not involve the issue of compensation stickiness. However, Tian Yuanyuan (2014) [8] made a study of associating the large stockholder control, executive compensation stickiness with governance efficiency, it is concluded that improving the equity concentration can inhibit or relieve executive compensation stickiness, and then improve the governance efficiency of the salary mechanism. From a practical standpoint, executive compensation is formulated by the Remuneration Committee of the board of directors, and the phenomenon of large stockholders controlling the board of directors is widespread, especially large stockholder will be directly participate in and formulate executive compensation in natural person holding companies with flexible system and mechanism. When the company's performance has risen substantially, the actual controller may implement "award" mechanism; when company's performance declines, "punishment" is generally not easily implemented. The author believes that the higher proportion of large stockholders holding, the more "flexible" phenomenon is more likely to arise, so makes the following series of assumptions: H1:The natural person holding company has sticky characteristics of executive compensation.
H2:The executive compensation stickiness of natural person holding company is positively correlated to the controlling proportion of the first largest shareholder.
H3:The executive compensation stickiness of natural person holding company is positively correlated to the equity restriction ratio.
H4:The interaction between executive compensation stickiness and the controlling proportion of the largest shareholder is beneficial to the improvement of corporate performance in natural person holding companies.
H5:The interaction between executive compensation stickiness and the equity restriction ratio is beneficial to the improvement of corporate performance in natural person holding company.
III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND MODEL CONSTRUCTION

A. Sample selection and data sources
The study takes the data of listed company controlled by natural person stockholders as the original samples in small and medium sized enterprises board, excluding ST or *ST companies, the top three executives' compensation with no changes for two consecutive years, and sample companies with missing data. Finally 210 valid samples are formed, and the study period is during 2012 to 2015. The data is derived from CNINF, CSMAR Solution professional securities website, using SPSS20.0 statistical software for data statistics and analysis.
B. Definition of variables and construction of models
The calculation of executive compensation stickiness is formula 1:
PNA and EC respectively show the performance of listed companies and executive compensation. Among them, PNA take Per Net Asserts as a measure target of corporate performance; EC take the total compensation of top three executives as a measure target of executives' compensation; i indicates the year i, using Table 1 .
The construction of model which shows the interaction between executive compensation stickiness and controlling shareholder on corporate performance is in formula 2. Among this model, α is intercept; θ 1~θ2 , γ 1~γ3 is regression coefficient; ε is random error. 
IV. EMPIRICAL TESTS
A. Correlation analysis
From the correlation analysis table 2, it shows corporate performance (Tobin's Q) is positively correlated to the controlling proportion of the first largest stockholder (YD), but there are no significant correlation with executive compensation stickiness (ln|ECS|) and equity restriction ratio (ZD). In addition, corporate performance is positively correlated to the size of enterprise (SIZE) and asset-liability ratio (LEV).
B. Multiple regression analysis and robustness test 1) Multiple regression analysis.
The research uses the regression method to do empirical analysis. For variable stepping method, the probability of using F to engage is 0.05, and to delete is 0.10. The results of multiple regression analysis are shown in Table 3 . Table 3 shows that firstly, the adjustment of R 2 = 0.303, goodness of fit is ordinary; secondly, Dubin-Waston value is about 2, which means there are no positive correlation among the independent variables in the model; thirdly, the value of VIF meets the standards range of 0 to 10, it shows there is no multidisciplinary in each variable in the model, and the Sig=0.000 shows that all variables are significant at the level of 0.01. As a result, the constructed model has passed the F test, and it is valid.
Regression result of table 3 shows the cross term is significant positively correlated between ln|ECS| and YD, and it is positively correlated between ln|ECS| and ZD but not significant.
2) Robustness test.
In order to better validate the impact of interaction on corporate performance between executive compensation stickiness and the controlling of large stockholder in the natural person holding companies, and use total return on assets (ROA) to replace Tobin's Q. Total return on assets = Net profit / Average total assets*100%.(As space is limited, the form is omitted). By comparing the results of multiple regression analysis and the robustness test, we can see that by using the total return on assets (ROA) to replace Tobin's Q, the results are consistent. It means the robustness test is adopted in this study. 
Correlation analysis
H1
The natural person holding company has sticky characteristics of executive compensation stickiness Exist
H2
The executive compensation stickiness of natural person holding company is positively correlated to the controlling proportion of the first largest shareholder
↑ No significant
H3
The executive compensation stickiness of natural person holding company is positively correlated to the equity restriction ratio ↑ No significant regression analysis
H4
The interaction between executive compensation stickiness and the controlling proportion of the first largest shareholder is beneficial to the improvement of enterprise value ↑ Significant
H5
The interaction between executive compensation stickiness and equity restriction ratio is beneficial to the improvement of enterprise value ↑ No significant
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Comprehensive studies of hypothesis and empirical results (Table 4) show that in the natural person holding companies, executive compensation stickiness is widespread, and there is not much related to the equity control of main stockholder. But the interaction between them has a positive effect on corporate performance. It shows that the executive compensation stickiness of natural person holding companies and the equity control of large shareholders not only do not harm the company performance, but also improve the companies' performance, thus proving the rationality of its existence.
For the long-term development of the enterprise, it suggests as follows:
(1) Effective control of executive compensation stickiness. While hiring professional managers, it should avoid the "executive inertia" due to the excessive compensation stickiness, and pay attention to the linkage between executive compensation and companies' performance.
(2) Establish a scientific salary assessment mechanism. In reality, due to the related executive responsibilities are not clear, rights and obligations is unclear or difficult to measure, which requires the salary development team should have strong professional ability, and develop scientific and reasonable compensation plan.
